Conservadorismo contábil em empresas complexas by Silva, Alini da et al.
ISSN 1808-057X
R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 30, n. 79, p. 42-57, jan./abr. 2019 42
DOI: 10.1590/1808-057x201806530
*Paper presented at the XVII International Conference in Accounting, São Paulo, SP, Brazil, July 2017.
Original Article













1 Universidade Regional de Blumenau, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Contábeis, Blumenau, SC, Brazil
2 Universidade Federal do Paraná, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Métodos Numéricos e Engenharia, Curitiba, PR, Brazil
3 Universidade Regional de Blumenau, Departamento de Contabilidade, Blumenau, SC, Brazil
Received on 09.04.2017 – Desk acceptance on 11.08.2017 – 2nd version approved on 05.12.2018 – Ahead of print on 10.08.2018
Associate Editor: Eliseu Martins
ABSTRACT
This study seeks to investigate the influence of the complexity of companies on levels of accounting conservatism. The subject 
of analysis, accounting conservatism in complex companies, can be considered relevant because it analyzes conservative 
practices taking into account the organizational context of companies; something that is ignored in other studies that 
investigate the incentives or determinants of accounting conservatism, at least as far as firm complexity is concerned. The 
research presents statistical evidence that accounting conservatism varies positively with the information asymmetry caused by 
specific characteristics of complex environments. On the other hand, when companies present several complex characteristics 
together, then the trend is one of little adoption of conservatism. In addition, this research brings together evidence that 
aims to contribute to accounting science by analyzing complex companies and conservatism and not the opportunistic 
practices observed in previous studies. The sample refers to 110 publicly traded companies from 2010 to 2016. The data 
collection was carried out using company reports, such as reference forms, registration data, and explanatory notes, as well 
as the Economatica® database. The data analysis was performed using multiple linear regression and quantile regression. The 
evidence obtained in the research indicates that accounting conservatism varies according to the information asymmetry 
caused by complex environments, in which it can present a positive relationship in companies with few characteristics of 
complexity, or a negative relationship if the company has complexity in several characteristics at the same time. It throws light 
on the different levels of conservatism observed in companies, which can often be attributed to mechanisms of governance, 
organizational culture, and accounting standards, among other factors, which are results that may be biased if the company 
complexity factor is not considered.
Keywords: accounting conservatism, firm complexity, information asymmetry, accounting information, Brazilian companies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Accounting conservatism can be observed as a 
mechanism of control in organizations that favor the 
recognition of results in the least opportunistic period, 
which, according to LaFond and Watts (2008) and Chi and 
Wang (2010), can help reduce information asymmetry. 
This, on the other hand, can be aggravated when companies 
present certain complex characteristics that, according to 
Liu and Lai (2012) and Jennings and Tanlu (2014), limit 
the transparency of information. Thus, this study intends 
to analyze the influence of the complexity of companies 
on the level of conservatism adopted in the information 
disclosed by firms.
Information is of the upmost importance for all 
and any type of organization and besides making the 
organization’s processes slower, its disparity between 
users can aggravate internal and external conflicts of 
interest (Ndofor, Wesley & Priem, 2015). In this aspect, 
costs in organizations began to be questioned by the 
studies from Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and Ross 
(1973), seeking to align interests between agents and their 
superiors (Faria, Gomes, Dias & Alburquerque, 2011), 
with the aim of reducing the disparity or asymmetry of 
information between them.
Roth and O’Donnell (1996) argue that information 
asymmetry can be aggravated when a company presents 
complex situations, with difficulties in monitoring and 
verifying the agent’s behavior. It is thus perceived that 
complexity in companies can be one of the possible causes 
of an increase in the level of informational asymmetry.
With regard to the complexity of companies, this can 
be defined by organizational activities and/or phenomena 
that would go against the paradigm of simplicity, using a 
multidimensional and multidisciplinary view to observe a 
particular phenomenon; that is, a particular phenomenon 
should be analyzed in terms of different aspects (Santos 
& Rodrigues, 2007). 
There is not only one form of measurement for the 
complexity of companies. According to the literature, this 
can be identified in accordance with various measures, 
such as the number of segments that the company 
participates in (Barinov, Park & Yildizhan, 2014; Baysinger 
& Hoskisson, 1989; Demirkan, Radhakrishnan & Urcan, 
2012), geographical complexity (Bushman, Chen, Engel & 
Smith, 2004; Cetorelli & Goldberg, 2014; Liu & Lai, 2012), 
complexity of the business (Cetorelli & Goldberg, 2014; 
Jennings & Tanlu, 2014), industrial complexity (Barinov 
et al., 2014; Bushman et al., 2004; Farooqi, Harris & Ngo, 
2014; Liu & Lai, 2012), and organizational complexity 
(Farias, 2012; Silva, 2015).
According to Liu and Lai (2012), the complexity of 
companies can limit the transparency of information 
for users, increasing informational asymmetry. This 
occurs, among other things, due to a company being more 
concerned about the segments that generate the greatest 
revenue, which can result in less attention being paid to 
internal controls and to the generation of more concise 
information on the other segments or subsidiaries that are 
not as representative in the generation of revenue. Also, 
according to Jennings and Tanlu (2014), it becomes costly 
for agents to show information by segment of complex 
companies, which ultimately impairs the quality of the 
information for external users. 
LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that one way of helping 
to reduce information asymmetry between investors and 
managers is by using a conservative form of accounting. 
Thus, there would be a reduction in managers’ incentives 
to mask results, reducing asymmetric information and 
also organizational losses that derive from it. Another 
study that shows the benefits of accounting conservatism 
for companies with incidences of asymmetric information 
is the one by Chi and Wang (2010), who concluded that 
levels of accounting conservatism were negatively related 
with levels of information asymmetry. It was inferred that 
accounting conservatism contributes to a reduction in 
information asymmetry between external users, by adopting 
accounting practices that do not overvalue earnings. 
As well as through the use of conservatism as a tool 
for reducing asymmetry, Silva (2015) observed that when 
a company reaches a high level of firm complexity, from 
an industrial, business, and organizational viewpoint, 
information asymmetry experiences a fall due to an 
improvement in the quality of the accounting information. 
In this study, the increase in the quality of the accounting 
information came about from a reduction in the 
opportunistic practices of earnings management, when 
the company reached high indices of complexity.
It follows that when a company presents complex 
activities, the managers may adopt conservatism instead of 
opportunistic practices, due to internal controls or external 
pressures to reduce information asymmetry. However, it 
is worth mentioning that accounting conservatism can 
be motivated by numerous other causes, such as taxation 
factors, accounting standards, culture, and manager 
remuneration, among others. Nonetheless, this study 
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proposes to observe this practice from the perspective of 
the complexity of the activities of companies. 
Thus, this study is guided by the following question: 
what is the relationship between accounting conservatism 
and firm complexity? The aim is to discover the influence 
of the complexity of companies on the levels of accounting 
conservatism.
This study presents evidence that aims to contribute 
to accounting science and to organizational studies, by 
analyzing the mitigation of informational asymmetry in 
complex companies due to the use of conservatism instead 
of the reduction in opportunistic practices observed by 
international studies, such as those by Demirkan et al. 
(2012), Barinov et al. (2014), Farooqi et al. (2014), and 
Jennings and Tanlu (2014). 
In addition, besides the studies from LaFond and Watts 
(2008) and Chi and Wang (2010), already mentioned 
previously, the study from Almeida (2010) can be observed, 
which analyzed accounting conservatism and earnings 
management, among others, in competitive environments, 
concluding that the practice of conservatism was adopted 
to a greater degree in such environments to reduce 
asymmetries and make the company attractive to the 
market. However, this study differs from the one from 
Almeida (2010) by addressing the complexity of companies, 
instead of the competitiveness of the environment. 
Due to the lack of research in the area on the 
relationship between the complexity of companies and 
conservatism, as well as considering the literature that 
affirms that companies with a higher level of complexity 
have greater information asymmetry, this study is 
warranted for its analysis of conservatism as a way of 
limiting informational asymmetry in complex companies. 
It may, therefore, shed light on the different levels of 
conservatism observed in companies, which can often be 
attributed to mechanisms of governance, organizational 
culture, and accounting standards, among other factors, 
which are results that may be biased if they do not consider 
the firm complexity factor, which could explain some of 
the empirical differences observed. 
2. ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM
Within the different sets of accounting practices 
and procedures, the analysis regarding the relationship 
between conservatism and accounting regulation and its 
causalities is still in its infancy and/or inconclusive in the 
Brazilian literature (Santos & Costa, 2008). According 
to Scalzer, Beiruth, and Reina (2017), Brazilian studies 
have observed mixed results in relation to accounting 
conservatism and accounting standards, presenting results 
with positive and negative relationships and even results 
with no statistical significance. 
A review of the literature reveals the separation 
of accounting conservatism into conditional and 
unconditional. Unconditional conservatism is less 
researched due to it lacking consolidated metrics. By 
definition, it is taken that when evaluating wealth, 
minimum values should be chosen for assets/revenue 
and maximum values should be chosen for liabilities/
expenses (Paulo, Antunes & Formigoni, 2008). 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) describe conditional 
conservatism as the accounting tendency to recognize 
economic losses more quickly than gains. The adoption 
of conservative practices is stimulated by the debt market 
(Ball, Kothari & Robin, 2000) and by mechanisms of 
corporate governance (LaFond & Watts, 2008).
With regard to conditional conservatism, accounting 
traditionally expresses and knows it as the principle of 
not recognizing earnings in advance but doing so for 
losses (Bliss, 1924), and where choosing less optimistic 
options is considered to be positive. For Basu (1997), the 
interpretation of this principle is the level of verification 
of information by external users, in which “good news” 
denotes gains and “bad news” denotes losses.
Bad news is, in summary, a proxy for negative returns, 
timelily and more fully recognized in the results than 
good news, measured by positive returns (Banker, Basu, 
Byzalov & Chen, 2016; Basu, 1997). However, regardless 
of how much the recognition of assets/revenues and 
liabilities/expenses is asymmetric, these aim to help in 
reducing informational asymmetry (LaFond & Watts, 
2008) by disclosing a conservative result instead of an 
opportunistic one.
For Watts (2003), the explanation for the disclosure 
and use of this information asymmetrically lies in the 
intense connection between conservatism and contractual 
relations, with the intention of ensuring minimum 
guarantees for affairs in relation to pre-established 
obligations. Also, for the author, in contract terms, the 
growth of company value is observed through the use of 
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conservatism, since this restricts opportunistic behavior 
by managers, keeping the disclosed accounting numbers 
more neutral. 
The relationship between conservatism and the quality 
of accounting information is controversial, especially after 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
revised the framework and removed conservatism from the 
condition of faithful representation, since it is inconsistent 
with neutrality. In the end, would conservative accounting 
practices be beneficial to the quality of accounting 
information or not? Would information free from bias 
(neutral), as prescribed by the IASB, accept conservative 
accounting practices?
Despite the academia not yet offering a definitive 
answer to these questions, authors (LaFond & Watts, 
2008) who study conservatism reflect on its importance 
to companies and consider it to be a mechanism of 
governance in companies that contributes to reducing 
information asymmetry, restricting the administration’s 
ability to manage and possibly overstate their financial 
performance. Therefore, conditional conservatism can 
be considered a limiter of the recognition of excessively 
optimistic earnings and a mechanism of control that has 
an impact on reducing asymmetry and on the quality 
of information.
From this perspective, despite accounting conservatism 
producing possibly biased (non-neutral) information, 
it nonetheless has the ability to improve the quality 
of accounting information, mitigating opportunistic 
practices that could lead to artificially inflated results, 
which might be more prejudicial to the users of the 
accounting information than less optimistic information.
To verify companies’ adherence to accounting 
conservatism, different measurement models can be used, 
the most recognized one being that of Basu, from 1997. 
Recently, with the aim of enhancing the Basu model, 
Banker et al. (2016) proposed a modification, combining 
the theory of conservatism from financial accounting 
with cost asymmetry from cost accounting.  
The authors analyzed the Basu (1997) model and 
showed an error of approximately 25% in the estimation 
of conservatism caused by not controlling for cost 
asymmetry. This is due to the fact that the positive 
variation (increase) in costs in periods of greater sales is 
higher than the negative variation (reduction) in periods 
of falls in sales. Thus, the authors proposed the inclusion 
of cost asymmetry variables in the original Basu (1997) 
model to correct this estimation error (Banker et al., 2016).
Another model used to measure conservatism is that 
of Khan and Watts (2009), which helps to identify this at a 
company level, also adapting the Basu (1997) model. The 
authors included variables such as the size, market-to-
book, and leverage of each company in the original model 
to identify its level of conservatism, called the C_Score.
In light of the above, it is considered that conservative 
accounting practices, observed by models such as those 
from Basu (1997), Khan and Watts (2009), and Banker et al. 
(2016), can help in reducing the informational asymmetry 
between companies and their various stakeholders, which 
may be interesting especially for complex companies, 
which are characterized by environments with greater 
informational asymmetry.
2.1 Complexity of Companies and Formulation 
of the Hypotheses
Company complexity is understood as an increase in 
different organizational elements, which should be treated 
simultaneously by the organization. Company complexity 
can be regarded as an ambiguity in an organization and 
difficulty knowing and understanding the organizational 
operations (Jennings & Tanlu, 2014).
It can be inferred that company complexity refers to 
specific characteristics that contradict the paradigm of 
simplicity in their business operations (Santos & Rodrigues, 
2007). These characteristics can be divided and/or measured 
in a number of groupings, such as industrial, business, and 
organizational complexity (Silva, 2015).
Complexity was primarily analyzed in accounting in 
the area of strategy, in the area of finance, and currently, 
studies in financial accounting can be observed, 
more specifically regarding the quality of accounting 
information (Barinov et al., 2014; Demirkan et al., 2012; 
Farooqi et al., 2014; Jennings & Tanlu, 2014; Silva, 2015). 
According to the literature (Barinov et al., 2014; 
Demirkan et al., 2012; Farooqi et al., 2014; Jennings & 
Tanlu, 2014; Liu & Lai, 2012; Silva, 2015), the complexity 
of a company can limit the transparency of operations 
and information for external users, which can aggravate 
information asymmetry.
Jennings and Tanlu (2014) argue that as a company 
becomes organizationally complex, it will be more costly 
and difficult for managers to analyze the really relevant 
information to be disclosed to the market. This can 
compromise the quality of communication between the 
company and external users, increasing informational 
asymmetry.
Accounting conservatism in complex companies
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To reduce this asymmetry, Watts (2003), LaFond 
and Watts (2008), and Chi and Wang (2010) highlight 
conservatism as an important attribute of the disclosure 
of financial information, acting as a mechanism of control 
that can limit agency conflicts. Thus, it is inferred that this 
attribute of accounting information could help in reducing 
information asymmetry in complex environments. 
Almeida (2010) observed that in competitive 
environments, which present a similar measurement 
of complexity, the degree of accounting conservatism 
is increased, in order to reduce asymmetries and make 
the company attractive to the market in relation to the 
competition. 
Among the measures of complexity, industrial 
complexity can be measured, according to Liu and 
Lai (2012), Barinov et al. (2014,) Farooqi et al. (2014), 
and Silva (2015), using the Herfindahl index and its 
extensions, calculated by the ratio of the sales in each 
segment of the industry to the company’s total sales 
(Barinov et al., 2014; Hou & Robinson, 2006). Industrial 
complexity can compromise the quality of communication 
between users, thus increasing information asymmetry 
(Barinov et al., 2014). To help reduce this asymmetry, 
companies can adopt differentiated levels of accounting 
conservatism. This leads to the first research hypothesis 
being outlined:
H1: the greater the industrial complexity, the greater the degree 
of accounting conservatism.
The complexity of the business can be observed via the 
quantity of segments the company operates in (Cetorelli & 
Goldberg, 2014; Demirkan et al., 2012; Doyle, Ge & Mcvay, 
2007; Jennings & Tanlu, 2014; Silva, 2015), which represent 
the diversification of its operating areas. According to 
Liu and Lai (2012), an increase in asymmetry can be 
caused, among other factors, when companies disclose 
more detailed information solely on the main operating 
segment, reducing the transparency of information about 
the others. External users will know the aggregated cash 
flows of complex companies, but not the individual ones 
by operating segment (Liu & Lai, 2012). Thus, the second 
hypothesis is presented, namely that conservatism can 
be used to a greater degree in this situation of business 
complexity, in order to help reduce asymmetry:
H2: the greater the complexity of the business, the greater the 
degree of accounting conservatism.
Organizational complexity can be measured by the 
quantity of subsidiaries that the company has (Cetorelli 
& Goldberg, 2014), which represents its fragmentation, as 
well as by its size, by the number of years operating in the 
market, by the long term debts, by the capital structure, and 
by the profitability that it presents (Farias, 2012; Silva, 2015). 
The size of the company represents its diversification 
in terms of assets (rights and goods) (Silva, 2015), age 
is related to the organizational life cycle (Boone, Field, 
Karpoff & Raheja, 2007; Farias, 2012), long term debts and 
capital structure show the company’s financial diversity 
(Farias, 2012; Linck, Netter & Yang, 2008; Silva, 2015), 
and finally, its profitability represents the complexity 
of the organization’s earnings (Cardinaels, Roodhooft 
& Warlop, 2004). These measures have an impact on 
the way the company is managed, which makes it 
complex and can sometimes incentivize managers to 
adopt conservative accounting practices to mitigate the 
information asymmetry resulting from this context. Thus, 
the third hypothesis is presented:
H3: the greater the organizational complexity, the greater the 
degree of accounting conservatism.
In light of the above, it is believed that in an 
environment of firm complexity, whether industrial, 
organizational, or business-related, a company, equipped 
with internal controls or even due to external pressures 
from investors, can adopt accounting practices to reduce 
the informational asymmetry caused by the complexity 
of its organizational operations, such as accounting 
conservatism, for example, given that this reduces the 
management’s ability to exaggerate or even manipulate 
its financial performance (LaFond & Watts, 2008). Thus, 
the fourth and last research hypothesis is outlined, with 
the aim of jointly capturing industrial, business, and 
organizational complexity in a single measure. The 
objective is to evaluate whether, in the presence of high 
levels of complexity in different characteristics, companies 
are concerned about adopting a greater level of accounting 
conservatism.
H4: the greater the total complexity of companies, the greater 
the degree of accounting conservatism.
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3. METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
The population of the study comprised all the companies 
listed on the São Paulo Stock, Commodities, and Futures 
Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA). The sample was composed 
of 110 companies with available information on all the 
variables and the period analyzed. The analysis period 
covered 2010 to 2016, due to the adoption, from 2010 
onward, of the IASB accounting standard that foresees 
the attribute of neutrality in the qualitative characteristic 
of faithful representation (Accounting Pronouncements 
Committee, 2011 – CPC 00) instead of the accounting 
principle of prudence and/or of the convention of 
conservatism, present in the local accounting norms 
before 2010.
In this study, the choice was made to only analyze 
Brazilian companies, due to this being considered an 
adequate and sufficient sample to test the hypotheses, as 
well as due to the unavailability of information on the 
complexity of companies from other countries.
The data concerning the accounting conservatism 
models and the organizational complexity variables 
company size (SIZE), profitability (ROE), long term debts 
(LTD), and capital structure (CS) were collected from 
the Economatica® database. The data used to calculate 
industrial complexity (IC) and business complexity (BC) 
were collected from the explanatory notes. The data on 
the quantity of subsidiaries (SUB) that the companies 
had were collected from the reference forms, while the 
years in operation (YO) variable for the companies 
was collected from the registration data available from 
the BM&FBOVESPA website; both (YO, SUB) also 
compose the organizational complexity group. Below, 
the accounting conservatism models used are presented:
in which PLSit is the accounting result for the period 
(profit/loss) per share of company i in year t, Pit-1 is the 
average price of the share of company i in year t-1, Rit is 
the log-transformed return on the share of company i in 
year t, Dit is the dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 when the return on the share of company i in year t is 
negative and 0 otherwise, and Dit * Rit is the difference 
between the impact of the positive and negative returns. 
Conservatism implies that this coefficient (β3) is positive 
because bad news (negative returns) will be reflected to a 
greater extend in profit than good news (positive return). 
Equation 1 represents the Basu (1997) model, which 
demonstrates the level of accounting conservatism via 
the coefficient β3. According to Basu (1997), β2 represents 
both positive and negative return, while β3 only represents 
negative return. If β3 is positive, it shows the presence 
of accounting conservatism via the timely recognition 
of negative returns. However, according to Banker et al. 
(2016), this model can present bias in the estimation of 
the coefficient caused by cost asymmetry. 
In the study by Banker et al. (2016), in which one of the 
authors is also Sudipta Basu, the aim was to reformulate 
the Basu (1997) model in an attempt to neutralize 
cost asymmetry. Thus, in this study the Banker et al. 
(2016) model was also used to capture the conditional 
conservatism in the companies of the sample and compare 
with the coefficient calculated by the original Basu 
(1997) model. Model 2 refers to the Banker et al. (2016) 
accounting conservatism model.
in which DSit is the dummy variable, equal to 1 if there 
is a fall in sales from year t-1 to year t and 0 otherwise, 
∆St/Pit-1 is the change in sales from year t-1 to year 
t (variation in sales) dimensioned (divided) by the 
market value of the shares (share price) at the start of 
the fiscal year, and DSit * ∆St/Pit-1 is the multiplication of 
the variables DSit and ∆St/Pit-1, which represents the level 
of cost asymmetry of the companies, if the coefficient is 
shown to be positive. 
In addition to the models presented, this study also 
analyzes the Khan and Watts (2009) model, which uses 
the G_Score and the C_Score to determine the timely 
1
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃��
𝑃𝑃����� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑅𝑅�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�� ∗ 𝑅𝑅�� + 𝜀𝜀�� 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃��
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+ 𝛽𝛽� 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃�� ∗  ∆𝑃𝑃�� 𝑃𝑃����⁄ 𝑣𝑣��  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃��
𝑃𝑃����� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑅𝑅�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�� ∗ 𝑅𝑅�� 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃�� + 𝛽𝛽 ∆𝑃𝑃�� 𝑃𝑃����⁄
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2
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recognition of good and bad news, respectively. This model, 
unlike the Basu (1997) and Banker et al. (2016) models, 
enables the measurement of the individual conservatism 
for each company based on its general model, from which 
the coefficients are captured and the C_Score (proxy for 
conservatism) is determined based on the size, market-to-
book, and leverage of each company. The Khan and Watts 
(2009) model is presented in equation 3.
in which Sizei is the size of the company according to 
the natural logarithm of the market value, M/Bi is the 
market-to-book, Levi is the leverage measured by the long 
term and short term debt deflated by the market value, 
and μi and λi are constant empirical estimators for all the 
companies, but which vary according to time, estimated 
using annual cross-sectional regressions. 
With the estimators generated by equation 3, the G_
Score and the C_Score are calculated using equations 4 
and 5, stressing that these are not regression models, but 
rather equations for obtaining the conservatism index for 
each company according to the good news (G_Score) and 
bad news (C_Score).
The Khan and Watts (2009) model, expressed by 
equation 3, includes equations 4 and 5 in the original Basu 
(1997) model, expressed by equation 1, with the addition of 
the terms in the final brackets, which are needed to control 
the characteristics of the companies separately. Thus, in 
the presentation and analysis of the data, the three models 
(Banker et al., 2016; Basu, 1997; Khan & Watts, 2009) are 
used for the initial analysis in order to observe the level 
of measurement of conservatism based on each equation.
In addition, the Khan and Watts (2009) model was 
used to observe the individual conservatism of the 
companies based on the C_Score. The Banker et al. (2016) 
model, adapted based on the Khan and Watts (2009) 
methodology, was also measured to observe the C_score of 
each company, in whose model there is a cost asymmetry 
correction, presented by equation 6.
With the coefficients μi and λi of the model from 
equation 6, the G_Score and the C_Score that there 
would now be with the cost asymmetry correction 
were calculated. With these coefficients of individual 
accounting conservatism originating from the Khan and 
Watts (2009) and Banker et al. (2016) models adapted 
from Khan and Watts (2009), new models with annual 
company complexity data were run, in order to observe the 
main relationship of the study between the complexity of 
companies and accounting conservatism. Table 1 presents 
the complexity variables.
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃��
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+ 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�𝑅𝑅�(𝜆𝜆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ (𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + 𝜀𝜀�� 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃��
𝑃𝑃���� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑅𝑅��(μ� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�𝑅𝑅 (𝜆𝜆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ (𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + 𝜀𝜀�� 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃��
𝑃𝑃����� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑅𝑅��(μ� + 𝜇𝜇 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�𝑅𝑅�(𝜆𝜆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ (𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿 𝐷𝐷�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + 𝜀𝜀�� 
3
𝐺𝐺_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 =  𝛽𝛽� = 𝜇𝜇� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜇𝜇�𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�  




𝑃𝑃����� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�� + 𝑅𝑅��(μ� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝐷𝐷�𝑅𝑅�(𝜆𝜆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ (𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃��(ρ� + ρ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + ρ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + ρ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + ∆𝑃𝑃�� 𝑃𝑃����⁄ (τ� + τ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�
+ τ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + τ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) +  𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃�� ∗  ∆𝑃𝑃�� 𝑃𝑃����⁄ 𝐿𝐿��(φ� + φ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + φ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵�
+ φ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + 𝜀𝜀�� 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃��
𝑃𝑃����� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�� + 𝑅𝑅��(μ� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝐷𝐷�𝑅𝑅�(𝜆𝜆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ (𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃��(ρ� + ρ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + ρ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + ρ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + ∆𝑃𝑃�� 𝑃𝑃����⁄ (τ� + τ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�
+ τ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + τ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) +  𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃�� ∗  ∆𝑃𝑃�� 𝑃𝑃����⁄ 𝐿𝐿��(φ� + φ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + φ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵�
+ φ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + 𝜀𝜀�� 
6
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃��
𝑃𝑃����� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�� + 𝑅𝑅��(μ� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝐷𝐷�𝑅𝑅�(𝜆𝜆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝛿𝛿 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛿𝛿�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃� (ρ� + ρ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + ρ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + ρ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + ∆𝑃𝑃�� 𝑃𝑃����⁄ (τ� + τ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�
+ τ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + τ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) +  𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃�� ∗  ∆𝑃𝑃�� 𝑃𝑃����⁄ 𝐿𝐿��(φ + φ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + φ 𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵�
+ φ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + 𝜀𝜀 � 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃��
𝑃𝑃����� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�� + 𝑅𝑅��(μ� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝐷𝐷�𝑅𝑅�(𝜆𝜆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ (𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃 �(ρ� + ρ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + ρ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + ρ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + ∆𝑃𝑃�� 𝑃𝑃����⁄ (τ� + τ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�
τ 𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵 τ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) +  𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃�� ∗  ∆𝑃𝑃�� 𝑃𝑃����⁄ 𝐿𝐿��(φ� + φ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + φ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵�
+ φ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + 𝜀𝜀�� 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃��
𝑃𝑃����� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�� + 𝑅𝑅��(μ� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝐷𝐷�𝑅𝑅�(𝜆𝜆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ (𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿 𝐷𝐷�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃��(ρ� + ρ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + ρ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + ρ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) ∆𝑃𝑃�� 𝑃𝑃� ��⁄ (τ τ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�
+ τ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + τ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) +  𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃�� ∗  ∆𝑃𝑃�� 𝑃𝑃����⁄ 𝐿𝐿��(φ φ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� φ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵�
+ φ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + 𝜀𝜀�� 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃��
𝑃𝑃����� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�� + 𝑅𝑅��(μ� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝜇𝜇 𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝐷𝐷�𝑅𝑅�(𝜆𝜆 + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ (𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿� + 𝛿𝛿 𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷 𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 )
+ 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃��(ρ� + ρ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 ρ 𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + ρ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + ∆𝑃𝑃�� 𝑃𝑃�� �⁄ (τ� τ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�
+ τ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + τ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) +  𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃�� ∗  ∆𝑃𝑃 � 𝑃𝑃� ��⁄ 𝐿𝐿��(φ + φ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + φ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵�
+ φ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + 𝜀𝜀�� 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃��
𝑃𝑃����� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�� + 𝑅𝑅� (μ 𝜇𝜇 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝐷𝐷�𝑅𝑅�(𝜆𝜆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ (𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃��(ρ� + ρ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + ρ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + ρ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + ∆𝑃𝑃� 𝑃𝑃��⁄ (τ� + τ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�
+ τ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + τ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) +  𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃�� ∗  ∆𝑃𝑃 � 𝑃𝑃 ��⁄ 𝐿𝐿 (φ + φ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + φ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵�
+ φ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + 𝜀𝜀�� 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃��
𝑃𝑃����� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷�� + 𝑅𝑅��(μ� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜇𝜇�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝐷𝐷�𝑅𝑅�(𝜆𝜆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ (𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + 𝛿𝛿�𝐷𝐷�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + 𝛿𝛿 𝐷𝐷�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�)
+ 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃��(ρ� + ρ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + ρ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵� + ρ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + ∆𝑃𝑃�� 𝑃𝑃����⁄ (τ� + τ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�
+ τ 𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵 + τ 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + 𝐷𝐷 ∗  ∆𝑃𝑃�� 𝑃𝑃���⁄ 𝐿𝐿��(φ� + φ�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆� + φ�𝑀𝑀/𝐵𝐵�
�𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�) + 𝜀𝜀�� 
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C_Score of the equation from Khan and Watts (2009). Khan and Watts (2009)
Accounting conservatism 
coefficient (ACkwb)
C_Score of the equation from Banker et al. (2016) adapted to the 
methodology of Khan and Watts (2009).
Banker et al. (2016) adapted 
to the methodology from Khan 
and Watts (2009)
Industrial complexity (IC)
1 - (HHI = ΣNi=1 si
2)
Herfindahl index, which measures the share of sales of each segment of the 
company in relation to the company’s total sales, which varies from 0 to 1. 
Coefficient close to 1 represents high complexity. 
Barinov et al. (2014)
Business complexity (BC) Measured by the quantity of segments in which the company participates.
Demirkan et al. (2012), 
Barinov et al. (2014), 
Jennings and Tanlu (2014)
Number of subsidiaries (SUB) Number of subsidiaries of the company. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2014)
Years the company has operated 
(YO)
Quanity of years the company has operated in the market.
Doyle et al. (2007), 
Boone et al. (2007), 
Farias (2012)
Size of the company (SIZE) Natural logarithm of the company’s total assets.
Doyle et al. (2007), 
Farias (2012)
Profitability (ROE) Return on equity.
Doyle et al. (2007), 
Farias (2012)
Long term debts (LTD) Natural logarithm of the balance of long term debts.
Bushman et al. (2004), 
Farias (2012)
Capital structure (CS) Ratio between total liabilities and net equity at the end of the period. Farias (2012)
Total complexity (TC)
Total complexity index created based on the information on industrial, 
business, and organizational complexity, which varies from 0 to 1, the 
closer to 1 meaning the greater the complexity.
Created by the authors
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The total complexity (TC) variable, presented in 
Table 1, was developed by the authors, who used the 
weights of the industrial complexity (IC), business 
complexity (BC), and organizational complexity 
variables, by applying the entropy of information, to 
create a single TC index for each company, by applying 
the Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to 
Ideal Solution (Topsis).
Based on the complexity of companies (independent 
variables) and conditional conservatism variables observed 
via the coefficient of estimation from the Khan and Watts 
(2009) and Banker et al. (2016) models adapted to the 
Khan and Watts (2009) methodology, new equations were 
formulated, in order to observe the relationship between 
IC, BC, and organizational complexity and the level of 
accounting conservatism adopted by the companies.
For the data analysis, descriptive statistics, multiple linear regression, and quantile regression were used, calculated 
by the STATA software.
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿��
+ 𝛽𝛽�𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴�� + 𝜀𝜀�� 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿��
+ 𝛽𝛽�𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴�� + 𝜀𝜀�� 
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𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿��
+ 𝛽𝛽�𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴�� + 𝜀𝜀�� 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝑅𝑅𝑌𝑌𝑆𝑆�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿��
+ 𝛽𝛽�𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴�� + 𝜀𝜀�� 
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4. DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
This section presents the description and analysis of 
the data. Table 2 shows the summary of models 1, 2, and 
3, which aim to demonstrate the practice of accounting 
conservatism adopted by the Brazilian companies 
analyzed, in accordance with the Basu (1997), Khan 
and Watts (2009), and Banker et al. (2016) models; in 
these equations all the companies were analyzed together, 
without annual weighting, with the aim of only analyzing 
the conservatism coefficient, and not the relationship 
sought in the study.
Table 2 
Summary of equations 1 (Basu, 1997), 2 (Banker et al., 2016), and 3 (Khan and Watts, 2009)
Variables Coeff.
Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig.
Basu (1997) Banker et al. (2016) Khan and Watts (2009)
Rit β1 0.00477 0.000* 0.00446 0.000* 0.84471 0.455
Dit β2 -0.09429 0.013* -0.08430 0.035* -0.20330 0.536
Dit x Rit β3 0.38557 0.110 0.35379 0.140 -0.95065 0.405
DSit β4 - - -0.09749 0.011* - -
∆Sit / Pit-1 β5 - - -5.89e-1 0.685 - -
DSit x ∆Sit / Pit-1 β6 - - 2.41e-10 0.001* - -
Rit x Sizei μ2 - - - - -0.05014 0.534
Rit x M / Bi μ3 - - - - 0.00015 0.974
Rit x Levi μ4 - - - - 0.02012 0.744
Dit  x Rit x Sizei λ2 - - - - 0.03425 0.678
Dit x Rit x M / Bi λ3 - - - - 0.00142 0.795
Dit x Rit x Levi λ4 - - - - 0.12333 0.169
Sizei δ1 - - - - -0.00108 0.962
M / Bi δ2 - - - - -0.00121 0.497
Levi δ3 - - - - -0.04617 0.028*
Dit x Sizei δ4 - - - - -0.00057 0.980
Dit x M / Bi δ5 - - - - 0.00108 0.603
Dit x Levi δ6 - - - - 0.06897 0.050*
R² 0.1114 0.1164 0.4219
Prob > F 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000*
Fixed effect year Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effect sector Yes Yes Yes
n 770 770 770
∆Sit / Pit-1 = change in sales in relation to year t-1 and to year t divided by the price of the shares; DSit x ∆Sit / Pit-1 = multiplication 
of the variables DSit  and  ∆Sit / Pt-1; DSit = dummy equal to 1 is there is a fall in sales from year t-1 to year t, and 0 otherwise; Dit = 
dummy that takes the value of 1 when the return on the share is negative and 0 when it is positive; Dit x Rit = difference between 
the impact of the positive and negative returns, with conservatism implying that this coefficient is positive; Levi = leverage 
measured by the long and short term debt deflated by the market value; M / Bi = market-to-book; Rit = return on the share; Sizei 
= company size according to the natural logarithm of the market value. 
* = significant at 10%.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
In Table 2, it is observed that the independent 
variables significantly explain the dependent variable. 
The explanatory power of the Basu (1997) and Banker et 
al. (2016) models can be considered low, which may be 
explained by the difficulty in estimating an accounting 
phenomenon, conservatism, using an econometric model.
The Khan and Watts (2009) model presents greater 
explanatory power, which may be due to the addition of 
the size, market-to-book, and Lev variables, which have 
a proven relationship, according to this study, with the 
dependent variable. The relevance of the Khan and Watts 
(2009) model warrants mentioning, since this presented 
a 30.55% improvement in explanatory power in relation 
to the greater R² of the other two models. 
Regarding the significant independent variables of 
the Basu (1997) and Banker et al. (2016) models, it is 
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perceived that both the Di (dummy for return on the 
share) and Ri (negative returns) variables were shown 
to be related to the earnings for the period (dependent 
variable), with the same not occurring with the Khan 
and Watts (2009) model. In addition, the coefficient of 
estimation of the variable (D x R) presented a positive 
sign in models 1 and 2, although not significant, which 
does not enable the timely recognition of bad news by 
the companies analyzed to be confirmed.
Regarding the estimation of conservatism by model 
3, the relationship found is negative, indicating a change 
in this coefficient with the inclusion of the size, M/B, 
and Lev variables, although not significant. Model 3 
highlights debt (Lev) as the determinant variable in 
explaining the accounting result for the period per 
company share (PLS).
It was also observed that the cost asymmetry variables 
from the Banker et al. (2016) model, such as DSit (dummy 
for fall in sales) and DSit X ∆Sit / Pit-1 (change in sales when 
these are falling), presented a significant influence on 
the dependent variable earnings, which indicates that 
earnings were also altered as a result of cost asymmetry, 
and not only due to accounting conservatism.
Having observed the estimations of conservatism by 
the models, Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of 
the variables used in the main analysis of the relationship 
between the complexity and accounting conservatism of 
each company.
Table 3 
Descriptive analysis of the variables of equations 7 and 8 – Accounting conservatism scores and complexity variables
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation
ACkwit – Conservatism score according to the Khan 
and Watts (2009) model
-6.0537 3.3554 -0.2652 1.0554
ACkwbit – Conservatism score according to the 
Banker et al. (2016) model adapted to the Khan and 
Watts (2009) methodology
-6.4078 4.2766 -0.3136 1.2125
β1ICit – Industrial complexity -0.0480 0.7472 0.2844 0.2429
β2BCit – Business complexity 1.0000 7.0000 2.7279 1.4902
β3SUBit – Subsidiaries 0.0000 109.0000 10.2290 12.8736
β4YOit – Years in operation 0.0000 122.0000 39.9130 27.2302
β5SIZEit – Company size 3.1714 11.1466 7.6585 1.4040
β6ROEit – Return on equity -132.86 145.1100 9.8764 18.6733
β7LTDit – Long term debt 1.4725 10.2348 6.6935 1.4333
β8CSit – Capital structure -619.52 1616.0916 24.4050 109.0634
β9TCit – Total complexity 0.0091 0.7915 0.2201 0.2380
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Based on Table 3, it is perceived that the proxy 
for accounting conservatism (ACkwit) from the 
Khan and Watts (2009) model has a minimum with 
negative values and a maximum with positive values, 
with it being understood that the company adopts 
conservative practices when this coefficient presents 
positive values. It is observed that the mean for the 
companies (-0.2652) corresponds to the non-adoption 
of conservative practices. However, as the standard 
deviation (SD) has a considerable value, with a range 
of companies with distant values in relation to the 
mean, a certain disparity is denoted in the sample 
regarding the adoption of conservative practices. The 
conservatism proxy estimated by the Banker et al. 
(2016) model adapted to the Khan and Watts (2009) 
methodology has similar values to that of the original 
model, with small variations.
Thus, there is an indication of low recognition of 
information in a conservative way by the companies 
analyzed in the period covering 2010 to 2016, which 
coincides with the obligatory period for CPC 00 (CPC, 
2011), which foresees the recognition of information 
in a neutral way. There is the perception of a possible 
adherence of the companies listed on the stock exchange 
to this regulation for neutral recording and a reduction 
in the use of conservative accounting practices.
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Regarding the IC variables, as these involve a Herfindahl 
entropy index, there is variation between 0 and 1, with 
the mean (0.2844) being closer to 0, which corresponds 
to the low IC among the companies analyzed; that is, 
there are a small number of companies with revenue 
concentrated in few segments.
The BC variable shows the quantity of segments in 
which the companies act, with it being found according to 
the mean that most operate in fewer than three segments, 
with a minimum value of one and a maximum of seven 
operating segments.
The quantity of SUB, considering only the controlled 
ones, presented a mean of 10, but with a higher SD than the 
mean, indicating high dispersion in the data. In addition, 
there are companies that do not have any control in 
another company, as well as some companies that control 
a maximum of 109. The quantity of YO for the companies 
varied from zero to 122, with some operating in their first 
year. The mean for the companies was almost 40 years.
ROE presented, on average, a positive return on net 
equity (NE). Both the LTD and the SIZE variables have 
normalized values, with both having values close to 6 
and 7, with low SDs. As for CS, this presented a mean of 
24.40 with a high SD.
Finally, TC presented a mean closer to 0 (0.2201), 
which indicates that most of the companies presented 
little complexity in various areas at the same time, with 
the maximum complexity being 0.7915.
Having carried out the descriptive statistics for the 
variables, Table 4 presents the summary of equations 7 
and 8, which measure the influence of the complexity of 
the companies on the level of accounting conservatism.
Table 4 






Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig.
β1ICit -0.1147411 0.634 0.2374754 0.385
β2BCit 0.0320191 0.402 0.0240654 0.585
β3SUBit 0.0206519 0.001* 0.0203797 0.003*
β4YOit 0.0032236 0.214 0.0046291 0.094*
β5SIZEit -0.0061671 0.888 0.0291108 0.572
β6ROEit 0.0056206 0.009* 0.0042664 0.093*
β7LTDit -0.0654348 0.058* -0.0383648 0.258
β8CSit 0.0000143 0.979 0.0015696 0.337
β9TCit -5.803408 0.008* -5.274703 0.035*
R² 0.0679 0.1101
Prob > F 0.0000* 0.0000*
Year effect Yes Yes
Sector effect Yes Yes
n 713 721
β1ICit = industrial complexity; β2BCit = business complexity; β3SUBit = subsidiaries; β4YOit = years in operation; β5SIZEit = company 
size; β6ROEit = return on equity; β7LTDit = long term debt; β8CSit = capital structure; β9TCit = total complexity; ACkwbit = Banker 
et al. (2016) conservatism score adapted to the Khan and Watts (2009) methodology; ACkwit = Khan and Watts (2009) 
conservatism score.
* = significant at 10%.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Based on Table 4, it is observed that the explanatory 
power (R²) of the equations was low, which has also been 
observed in international studies (Banker et al., 2016; Khan 
& Watts, 2009; LaFond & Watts, 2008) on this subject. 
Regarding the significance of the models, these were shown 
to be significant, demonstrating that the independent 
variables of complexity significantly explained part of 
the accounting conservatism adopted by the Brazilian 
companies. In this stage of the research, outlier information 
of 3 SDs in relation to the mean was excluded. 
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Regarding the independent variables of complexity, 
it was observed that the ROE, the number of SUB, the 
TC (equations 7 and 8), the quantity of YO (equation 8), 
and the LTD (equation 7) were shown to be significantly 
related to the practicing of conservative results. It can be 
observed that the higher the return on NE, the number 
of SUB, and YO, the greater the practicing of accounting 
conservatism tends to be. In contrast, the higher the 
LTD and the TC, the lower the level of conservatism 
tends to be.
With the aim of further explaining the relationships 
presented by Table 4, Table 5 shows the influence of the 
complexity variables in different quantiles of accounting 
conservatism (10, 50, 90).
Table 5 
Summary of equations 7 and 8 – Influence of the complexity variables on levels of conservatism with 10, 50, and 90 quantile 
















Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
β1ICit -0.56610* -0.01528 0.11467 0.20546* -0.03746 0.19530
β2BCit 0.11425* 0.13679* 0.00897 -0.00662 -0.00595 -0.01758
β3SUBit 0.03153* 0.02814* 0.00641* 0.01061* 0.00480 0.00910
β4YOit 0.00652* 0.00609* 0.00071 0.00284* 0.00044 0.00206
β5SIZEit 0.0159 -0.02203 0.02360 0.05989* 0.03507 0.04809
β6ROEit 0.00739* 0.00595 0.00116 0.00120 -0.00012 -0.00165
β7LTDit -0.09608 -0.13748* -0.02719 -0.0075 -0.00698 -0.01218
β8CSit -0.00053 0.002507 0.00060 0.00231* -0.00108 0.00117
β9TCit -8.8738* -6.7017* -1.5860 -3.892* -2.1772 -3.3787
R² 0.1905 0.2079 0.0773 0.0942 0.1249 0.1566
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
β1ICit = industrial complexity; β2BCit = business complexity; β3SUBit = subsidiaries; β4YOit = years in operation; β5SIZEit = company 
size; β6ROEit = return on equity; β7LTDit = long term debt; β8CSit = capital structure; β9TCit = total complexity; ACkwbit = Banker 
et al. (2016) conservatism score adapted to the methodology of Khan and Watts (2009); ACkwit = Khan and Watts (2009) 
conservatism score.
* = significant at 10%.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
According to Table 5, the relationship between 
conservative practices and company complexity occurs 
when the levels of conservatism are low and medium, 
which is not perceived when conservatism is high.
Regarding the significant independent variables, it 
is shown that ROE (quantile 10), the number of SUB 
(quantile 10 and 50), the quantity of YO (quantile 10 and 
50), BC (quantile 10), SIZE (quantile 50), and CS (quantile 
50) showed an influence in terms of increasing the level 
of accounting conservatism. As for LTD (quantile 10) 
and TC (quantile 10 and 50), these showed a relationship 
with a decrease in the practicing of conservative results.
In relation to the IC variable, as this presents a significant 
influence in terms of decreasing the conservatism in 
quantile 10 and increasing the conservatism in quantile 
50, it was considered a non-conclusive result when the 
accounting conservatism quantiles were evaluated, which 
could be better explored in future studies.
In Table 6, also with the aim of better explaining the 
relationships of equations 7 and 8, the same relationship 
between conservatism and complexity is presented, 
however with the separation of company samples that 
presented low, medium, and high TC.
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Table 6
Summary of equations 7 and 8 – Influence of the complexity variables on levels of conservatism for samples with low, medium, 
and high levels of total complexity
Variables
Level of complexity













Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
β1ICit -0.5153* 0.12996 0.78937 0.37012 0.14623 -0.03642
β2BCit 0.0386 0.02550 0.08232 0.07948 0.00220 0.03002
β3SUBit 0.01882* 0.00974 0.04415 0.04094 0.04379 0.14235*
β4OYit 0.00529* 0.00309 0.00152 0.00321 -0.00140 0.00890
β5SIZEit 0.00630 0.04039 1.49864* 1.15277* 3.21836* 2.91934*
β6ROEit 0.00209 -0.00317 0.01092* 0.00820* 0.01644 0.05278*
β7LTDit -0.05813 -0.01374 -1.3387* -0.99530* -2.45653* -2.23520*
β8CSit 0.00010 0.00164 0.01091 0.00263 -0.03599 0.00169
β9TCit -5.6555* -1.322953 -15.025 -12.3107 -52.8146 -221.183
R² 0.1015 0.1230 0.2281 0.2405 0.2553 0.2153
Prob > F 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000*
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 500 503 114 112 99 106
β1ICit = industrial complexity; β2BCit = business complexity; β3SUBit = subsidiaries; β4YOit = years in operation; β5SIZEit = company 
size; β6ROEit = return on equity; β7LTDit = long term debt; β8CSit = capital structure; β9TCit = total complexity; ACkwbit = Banker 
et al. (2016) conservatism score adapted to the Khan and Watts (2009) methodology; ACkwit = Khan and Watts (2009) 
conservatism score.
* = significant at 10%.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The significance of the models is observed, with 
there being an improvement in the explanatory power 
of equations 7 and 8 separated by samples of companies 
with low, medium, and high levels of TC, in relation to 
the previous analyses.
It was observed that ROE (medium and high levels), 
the number of SUB (low and high levels), the quantity 
of YO (low level), and SIZE (medium and high levels) 
presented an influence in terms of increasing the level of 
accounting conservatism. However, LTD (medium and 
high levels) and TC (low level) showed a relationship 
with reduced conservatism.
IC (low level) showed a relationship with a reduced 
level of conservatism; however, due to the analysis of 
Table 5, this variable is also considered to have a non-
conclusive explanation in relation to conservatism, as 
its coefficient presents a positive and negative sign. In 
relation to the other significant variables, there is an 
observed tendency for a relationship between these and 
accounting conservatism, even with the alteration of 
quantiles and samples. 
Based on the above, it was observed that IC did not 
show a conclusive relationship with the level of accounting 
conservatism, thus rejecting H1.
This result is consistent with the one obtained 
by Almeida (2010), which observed that companies 
adopt a greater degree of accounting conservatism 
when there is an increase in information asymmetry 
resulting from competitive environments, which reveals 
the representativeness of this in relation to the other 
companies from their operating segment. However, 
there is a difference between that study and the result 
of this research, since this research considers IC due to 
the diversification of revenue from a particular segment 
compared to other segments of the same company, while 
Almeida (2010) considered SIZE in relation to the other 
companies from the segment.
BC presented a significant influence on the adoption 
of conservatism, especially when this has a low level in 
the organization, which leads to evidence for the non-
rejection of H2.
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In relation to the organizational complexity variables, 
it was found that return on NE, the number of SUB, 
the quantity of the company’s YO, SIZE, and CS had a 
significant influence in terms of increasing conservative 
accounting practices; on the other hand, LTD presented 
a relationship with decreased conservatism.
As some organizational complexity variables presented 
a positive relationship with conservatism, H3 is not 
rejected, although this is not confirmed for all the variables 
that sought to capture organizational complexity.
These results are consistent with those observed by 
Farooqi et al. (2014) and Silva (2015), which indicate that 
companies that have some measures of complexity can 
adapt practices to improve the quality of information and 
reduce the information asymmetry caused by complex 
environments. 
According to Farooqi et al. (2014) and Silva (2015), 
the complexity of companies can be conceived under 
various measures and thus impact information asymmetry 
differently, as well as the quality of accounting information. 
Thus, this result was confirmed by the current study, with 
the complexity measures BC, ROE, SUB, YO, SIZE, and 
CS demonstrating a significant influence in terms of 
increasing the use of conservative practices.
On the other hand, it was found that the TC 
variable, which shows companies with various 
complex characteristics at the same time (ID, BC, and 
organizational), presented a significant relationship with 
reduced accounting conservatism, thus rejecting H4.
This result for TC may be due to the fact that a company 
cannot control all its operations when it is complex in 
various characteristics, which can compromise adoption. 
Or also, as a possible explanation, companies with various 
complex characteristics prefer not to adopt a greater 
degree of accounting conservatism, however much it 
is convention, due to the bias that it can create in the 
result, which could possibly increase the perception of 
information asymmetry between investors even more, 
as well as its own complexity, as highlighted by LaFond 
and Watts (2008). According to these authors, accounting 
conservatism is indicated to reduce information 
asymmetry; on the other hand, when losses are brought 
forward and earnings delayed, this can increase the level of 
asymmetry perceived among investors even more, since it 
creates bias in the result, which may explain this negative 
relationship between TC and conservatism.
Based on the results, Table 7 presents the expected 
sign for the hypotheses, as well as the acceptance or 
rejection of these.
Table 7
Sign observed for the hypotheses
Hypothesis Expected sign Observed sign
H1: the greater the industrial complexity, the greater the degree 
of accounting conservatism
Positive Non-conclusive (positive and negative)
H2: the greater the business complexity, the greater the degree of 
accounting conservatism
Positive Positive
H3: the greater the organizational complexity, the greater the 
degree of accounting conservatism
Positive
Positive, except for the long term debt variable,
which presented a negative sign
H4: the greater the total complexity of companies, the greater 
the degree of accounting conservatism
Positive Negative
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Based on Table 7, the observance of a positive sign 
for BC and the organizational complexity variables is 
observed, without considering LTD, as stipulated by the 
hypotheses. As for the TC variable, this presented an 
opposite sign to expected, and IC presented a positive 
sign in some models and a negative one in others, making 
its result inconclusive, which could be better investigated 
in future studies.
5. FINAL REMARKS
The results showed the estimation of the accounting 
conservatism adopted by Brazilian companies in the period 
from 2010 to 2016, according to the Basu (1997), Khan 
and Watts (2009), and Banker et al. (2016) models. In this 
study, and in accordance with what was reported by Banker 
et al. (2016), errors of estimation of conservatism in the 
original Basu (1997) model were observed in the sample 
of Brazilian companies, caused by cost asymmetries.  
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In the analysis of the relationship between the 
complexity measures and the conservative accounting 
practices, the results showed that BC and organizational 
complexity, from the perspective of return on NE, quantity 
of SUB, YO, SIZE, and CS, had an influence in terms of 
increasing the level of accounting conservatism adopted 
by the companies.
Considering that the literature foresees that the 
complexity of companies can limit the transparency 
of information and lead to a substantial increase in 
information asymmetry, it is inferred that the companies 
that presented BC and organizational complexity (ROE, 
SUB, YO, SIZE, and CS) may have adopted more 
conservative accounting practices with the aim of 
mitigating this asymmetry. This inference is warranted 
because, in an environment with greater uncertainty, as the 
environment of complex companies can be characterized, 
the manager or preparer of accounting statements may 
opt for more conservative accounting choices, which 
ultimately generates asymmetric recognition of losses in 
relation to gains (timely recognition of losses).
It is thus concluded that certain complex firm 
environments (BC, ROE, SUB, YO, SIZE, and CS) were 
shown to be related to conservative accounting practices, 
which may be indicative of a reduction in information 
asymmetry in such environments. These measures of 
complexity were associated with an increase in the level 
of conservatism when analyzed separately, that is, when 
a company only has BC, for example, and perhaps not 
the others. On the other hand, the companies that at the 
same time presented various measures of complexity, to 
which TC refers, showed a relationship with a reduction 
in conservative practices. 
This result for TC may be connected to the fact that 
highly complex environments, such as when a company 
presents the three types of complexity, are more common 
in large corporations, which have more mechanisms 
for mitigating informational asymmetry, and where 
accounting conservatism is not necessary or used less 
intensely for this. Or, also, according to LaFond and 
Watts (2008), highly complex companies may be adopting 
conservatism to a lesser degree with the aim of reducing 
the external market’s perception of asymmetry, seeking 
to reduce possible political costs resulting from the 
perception of this practice. However, these aspects were 
not the object of investigation in this study and could 
constitute a gap in the research to be explored by future 
studies.
In addition, as accounting conservatism may be due to 
numerous other factors, such as accounting standards, the 
company’s organizational culture, manager remuneration, 
contractual covenants, and taxation factors, among others, 
the results found in this study need to be viewed with 
caution, and new studies should be conducted to analyze 
these aspects. This study did not aim to exhaust the 
discussion on the topic, which is complex and warrants 
new analyses.
As a contribution from the study, it was found that 
accounting conservatism varies depending on the 
information asymmetry caused by complex environments, 
in which the relationship depends on whether the company 
presents complexity in few characteristics (positive 
relationship) or whether it has complexity in various 
characteristics at the same time (negative relationship). 
Therefore, this study sheds light on a new factor or variable 
that may influence the relationships already studied in 
the literature between conservatism and its determinants 
or incentives.
The main implication of this study consists of it 
suggesting that a more (less) complex organizational 
environment for companies can influence less (more) 
conservative accounting practices. This aspect can help 
explain contradictory results from previous studies on the 
determinants or incentives of accounting conservatism, 
as well as helping academics and accounting information 
users to better understand the more (less) conservative 
behavior of some companies, which can influence the 
quality of their reports.
Also, as suggestions for future studies, we recommend 
an analysis of the complexity of companies in relation 
to other measures of quality of accounting information, 
thus contributing to the current study, as well as an 
analysis of the accounting conservatism in other company 
environments with a higher or lower level of information 
asymmetry. We also encourage an analysis of not only 
accounting and economic but also social information, 
given that information asymmetry is not restricted to 
economic and accounting information alone.
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